Is the COE System a Social Engineering faux pas?

As a motoring enthusiast and a Logistician that is seeing Singapore’s position as a Logistics hub being challenged, partly due to high operating costs and where COE (Certificate of Entitlement) prices are just one contributing factor – I am wondering how this personal and professional dilemma will play out in the short to medium term and what the effects will be in the longer term.

Singapore as an island state and with good government and governance is a shining example on how social engineering can be successful. Singapore’s trajectory from a developing nation to a global economic powerhouse is often attributed to its strategic planning and policy execution. However, some policies, though well-intentioned, have led to unintended long-term consequences.

For example, in the 1970s, Singapore’s “Stop at Two” campaign was introduced to curb rapid population growth. It was successful — too successful. Decades later, the nation is grappling with a shrinking workforce, ageing population, and persistently low birth rates, despite generous incentives to reverse the trend. This is now often cited as a case of social engineering gone too far, where policy effectiveness outpaced its long-term foresight.

Singapore has seen several examples of well-intended social engineering policies that led to unintended or controversial outcomes. A few notable ones are:

1. Graduate Mothers Scheme (1984)

Intent: Encourage highly educated women to marry and have more children, while discouraging less educated women from having more.
Policy Features:
– Priority school placement for children of graduate mothers.
– Financial incentives for graduate mothers to have more children.
Outcome:
– Widely criticized as elitist and discriminatory.
– Caused public backlash and was quietly phased out.
– Perpetuated class divisions and gender stereotypes.

2. Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) in Public Housing (1989–present)

Intent: Prevent ethnic enclaves and promote racial harmony.
Policy Features:
– Ethnic quotas applied to HDB flat ownership by race.
Outcome:
– Successful in promoting ethnic mixing.
– However, it restricts property resale for minorities, especially Malays and Indians, affecting asset liquidity and financial planning.

3. Streaming in Education

Intent: Tailor education to students’ academic abilities for better outcomes.
Policy Features:
– Early streaming at Primary 4 or 6 into EM1, EM2, EM3 (now replaced), and Normal/Express/Technical in secondary school.
Outcome:
– Criticised for labelling and demotivating young children.
– Reinforced social stratification.
– Reforms have been ongoing to reduce rigid academic pathways.

4. Asset Enhancement Policy (1990s onward)

Intent: Boost home ownership and wealth through rising HDB property values.
Policy Features:
– Government upgrades and investment in mature estates.
Outcome:
– Created a wealth divide between older and newer homeowners.
– Over-dependence on housing as a retirement asset has become problematic, especially as lease decay becomes an issue.

5. MRT-Driven Urban Planning

Intent: Reduce car ownership and promote public transport use.
Policy Features:
– Urban nodes built around MRT stations to decentralize the city center.
Outcome:
– Effective in mobility and planning.
– But underinvestment in maintenance and poor management led to reliability and safety concerns (notably the 2011 and 2024 MRT breakdowns), damaging public trust.

The COE System: Mobility and Middle-Class Strain & Increased Logistics Costs

When comparing the COE system and the stop at two policy is it fair to ask if a similarly well-intentioned policy has overshot its goals. This is a nuanced and deeply layered question — one that links population policy, urban planning, and transport economics under the umbrella of social engineering and one that touches on the intersection of demography, mobility, and governance in Singapore’s policy landscape.

Introduced in 1990, when the population stood at just over 3 million, the COE system was designed to control vehicle ownership and manage road congestion by requiring individuals to bid for a certificate to own a car. While effective in limiting the number of vehicles, the system has led to soaring COE prices, with premiums reaching as high as US$100,000, excluding the cost of the car itself.

This has placed a significant burden on the middle class, making car ownership increasingly unattainable for many. Analysts have noted that the system disproportionately affects middle-income families, who may still aspire to own a car but find themselves priced out of the market . The result is a growing sense of inequality and frustration, as mobility becomes a luxury rather than a convenience.

Logistics operations in Singapore, are much higher when compared to just across the causeway in Malaysia. COE’s contribute to these costs. As the owner of an SME Logistics company, with an ageing fleet of vehicles that need their COE renewed, I am experiencing this challenge of high operating costs first hand.

There are also social groups calling for the restriction of the transport of workers in open trucks but due to the high costs of transport in Singapore and where this affects mainly foreign workers and where COE plays a huge part, this has gained little traction.

Population Growth and Urban Planning: A Balancing Act

Singapore’s population has surpassed 6 million, with projections suggesting it could reach up to 6.9 million by 2030 . As the city-state plans for this growth, infrastructure and urban planning must adapt accordingly. However, policies like the COE system may inadvertently hindered these efforts by limiting mobility options for a significant portion of the population.

So, Is the COE social engineering gone wrong?

Today, the COE system seems to be navigating a similar trajectory to other social engineering missteps such as those highlighted above and the stop at two policy in particular. Initially implemented to manage road congestion and land use, it has evolved into a mechanism that rations vehicle ownership through pricing — inadvertently turning cars into luxury goods and placing the cost burden unevenly across socioeconomic groups and the Logistics industry.

If the two-child policy was about controlling who is born, COE is about controlling who moves — both guided by technocratic goals, but with long-term social equity implications.

In that light, COEs may be viewed as a new chapter of social engineering, where the cost of mobility becomes a proxy for shaping societal behaviour and urban form. The challenge now is ensuring that access, aspiration, and affordability are better aligned — before this becomes another policy that future generations must spend decades trying to reverse.

Like the two-child policy, COE began with clear objectives aligned to national constraints but:

It disproportionately affects the middle class.
Wealth, not need, now determines access to vehicles.
The system may no longer reflect current mobility expectations or economic diversity.

High Certificate of Entitlement (COE) prices in Singapore are not necessarily the result of social engineering gone wrong, but rather the intended outcome of a deliberate policy tool designed to:

Control vehicle population on limited land space
Manage congestion and pollution
Promote public transport use

Where this gets complex is when :

COEs have increasingly priced out the middle class, raising concerns about social equity.
Speculation and wealth disparity contribute to volatility and rising prices.
The original intent (to ensure fair access while managing road usage) can appear distorted when only the wealthy can afford car ownership.
Contributes to higher Logistics costs
Exposes a mainly foreign worker workforce transported in open trucks to higher risk of injury or death

It is not necessarily social engineering faux pas but rather a policy with trade-offs that now demands recalibration. It effectively controls car numbers, but at the cost of perceived fairness — prompting debate over how equitable and sustainable the system really is in 2025.

Well-intended policy can become outdated or inequitable if not recalibrated with time. Singapore’s experience with such policies suggests a key lesson — social engineering needs dynamic checks and balanced implementation to avoid unintended socio-economic divides.

When the COE system was introduced In 1990, Singapore had a population of just over 3 million. In 2025, this number is touching 6 million and projected to reach 6.9 million in 2030.

There is a compelling argument that Singapore’s high COE prices, like the “Stop at Two” population policy of the 1970s, may represent another chapter in over-corrective social engineering and social engineering misalignment. Does it make sense to stifle private transport access — particularly for families and workers on the urban fringe and also Logistics costs?

As mentioned earlier, introduced to control vehicle population, promote efficient land use and ease congestion, sky-rocketing COE prices has now priced personal mobility out of reach for many middle-income Singaporeans exacerbating inequality and mobility limitations but and also contributing to higher Logistics costs.

In both cases, the question is not whether the policies achieved their objectives —they did. The deeper concern is whether the social costs and long-term consequences were fully considered. When policies become overly technocratic without adapting to shifting societal needs, they risk repeating past mistakes — optimizing for control, but compromising equity and resilience.

All national policies in Singapore are driven by data, logic, and national foresight but when control overrides adaptability, society pays a deferred cost. True resilience lies in revisiting assumptions, adjusting course, and acknowledging that engineering a society is never a one-time design — it’s an ongoing conversation.

The challenge lies in balancing the need for sustainable urban development with equitable access to resources and opportunities. Just as the “Stop at Two” policy had unintended demographic consequences, the COE system’s impact on social equity and mobility warrants careful reconsideration.

Reflecting on Policy Implications

Singapore’s experience with the “Stop at Two” policy and the COE system underscores the importance of continuous policy evaluation and adaptability. While many initiatives are implemented with clear objectives, their long-term effects reveal the complexities of social engineering. As the nation continues to evolve, it is crucial to ensure that policies not only achieve their immediate goals but also align with broader societal values and the well-being of all citizens. As the country tries to “right-size” population growth — balancing infrastructure, sustainability, and
quality of life — COE prices and policies may reflect another form of top-down calibration. But are we again leaning too far?

Note: This editorial draws upon historical data and recent analyses to provide a comprehensive overview of the discussed policies and their implications.

About the Author

Raymon Krishan